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(2) Facts: Forty-three-year-old practicing lawyer, noncustodial
parent of two dependents. $350,000 in student loan debt.
Recovering alcoholic. Earns $48,000 per year as contract
lawyer.2
(3) Facts: Thirty-nine-year-old licensed lawyer, married.
$142,000 in student loan debt. Clinically depressed since
teen-age years. Earns $30,000 per year as secre-
tary/receptionist. Household income of $59,000.'
(4) Facts: Married couple, late thirties, one dependent.
$120,000 in combined student loan debt. Wife is middle
school music teacher, no disability. Husband is unemployed
and suffers from narcolepsy, obesity, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease. Household income of $38,000 per year.'
(5) Facts: Forty-six-year-old single mother, one dependent. Part-
time legal secretary earning $20,000 per year. History of
psychiatric problems. More than $52,000 in student loan
debt.5
These debtors have one thing in common: all had their student
loan debt discharged by a bankruptcy court. On appeal, however, all
but one had the discharge reversed by a circuit court. Which one and
why?
I. INTRODUCTION
As histcry has shown, a well-educated society is critical to our general wel-
fare and prosperity.6
With ever-rising college costs, student loans have become a neces-
sity of life for most, and many emerge from college or graduate pro-
grams with student loan debt that rivals a home mortgage.7 Although
2. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.Jesperson (In rejesperson), 571 F.3d 775 (8th
Cir. 2009).
3. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 425 F.3d 526 (8th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied 549 U.S. 811 (2006).
4. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosko (In re Mosko), 515 F.3d 319 (4th Cir.
2008).
5. Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reBrightful), 267 F.3d
324 (3d Cir. 2001).
6. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In reFrushour), 433 F.3d 393, 399
(4th Cir. 2005).
7. FinAid, http://www.finaid.org/loans/ (lastvisited Mar. 14,2010). The aver-
age cumulative debt for a four-year undergraduate degree is $22,656. Id. Graduate
and professional degrees add, on average, an additional $30,000 to $120,000 to the
undergraduate debt. Id. The largest debt the authors have encountered was more
1680 [Vol. 36:4
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federal student loans are a boon to achieving educational success,
their repayment often seems the bane of life ever after. To protect
the federal student loan program, Congress deemed student loan
debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy except in very rare circums-
tances.8 Over the last three decades, Congress has increasingly nar-
rowed the bases on which debtors may discharge their loans in bank-
ruptcy.9 As of October 8, 1998, the only way debtors may discharge
than $700,000 and consisted of federal and private student loan debt. Blackbird v.
Wachovia Bank, No. 07-4039, slip op. at 13 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2007). In
Blackbird, the bankruptcy court discharged all but $45,000 in private loan debt of this
balance. Id. at 18. Only the Educational Credit Management Corporation (ECMC)
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP). The BAP reversed
the bankruptcy court's discharge of Blackbird's federal student loan debt, which by
this time had grown to nearly $240,000. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Blackbird, No.
07-1454-KJuKu, slip op. at 8 n.10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.July 11, 2008),judgment amended by
No. 07-1454-KJuKu (B.A.P. 9th Cir. July 14, 2008) (correcting the erroneous state-
ment of the July 11 judgment that the bankruptcy court's decision had been af-
firmed).
8. SeeFrushour, 433 F.3d at 399.
9. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 449 (2004); He-
mar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In reCox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11 th Cir. 2003) ("Con-
sidering the evolution of § 523 (a) (8), it is clear that Congress intended to make it dif-
ficult for debtors to obtain a discharge of their student loan indebtedness.").
The first federal student loan program began in 1958 with the National De-
fense Education Act of 1958. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-864, §§ 201-09, 72 Stat. 1580, 1583-87 (1958) (enacted) (establishing the Perkins
Loan program). The Higher Education Act followed in 1965, creating the Guaran-
teed Student Loan Program (n/k/a the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP)). Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965)
(enacted).
Until 1977, borrowers could discharge their student loan debt, like any other
unsecured debt, in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1976). Even then, the discharge
exception only applied to Chapter 7 bankruptcies. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523,92 Stat. 2590-91 (1978) (enacted). Under this law, borrow-
ers could request a discharge by showing that (1) "the loan first became due before
five years... before the date of the filing of the petition," 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (A)
(1989), or (2) "excepting such debt from discharge... [would] impose an undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents." Id. § 523(a) (8) (B) (2007).
In 1990, in reaction to debtors who were using Chapter 13 to discharge their
student loan debt without making substantial and meaningful payments, Congress
extended the discharge exception to Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Student Loan Default
Prevention Initiative Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, § 3007 (b), 104 Stat. 1388-28 (1990)
(enacted). Shortly thereafter, Congress increased the five-year discharge provision of
§ 523(a) (8) (A) to seven years. Pub. L. 101-647, § 3621(1)-(2), 104 Stat. 4964-4965
(1990) (enacted). Then, in 1998, Congress eliminated a time-based basis for dis-
charge altogether, leaving undue hardship as the only basis to discharge student loan
debt in bankruptcy. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. 105-244, §
971(a), 112 Stat. 1837 (1998).
Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (BAPCPA), Congress expanded the types of loans that fall under § 523(a) (8).
2010] 1681
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student loan debt in bankruptcy is to prove that repayment would be
an undue hardship. 0 But in carving out this exception to general dis-
charge, Congress left the definition of "undue hardship" up to the
courts.
Although Congress created one legal standard for student loan
discharge, two tests have emerged to aid bankruptcy courts in decid-
ing whether debtors have met the legal standard of undue hardship.
Nine out of eleven circuits use the Brunner test, which originated in
the Second Circuit in 1987." Only the Eighth Circuit has formally re-
jected the Brunner test, preferring instead a "less restrictive". "totality
12
of the circumstances" test (totality-of-the-circumstances test). The
existence of two different tests has sometimes produced disparate re-
sults among the circuits. In its recent Educational Credit Management
Corp. v. Jesperson decision, however, the Eighth Circuit seems to have
signaled a change-a yellow light, so to speak-that it is tightening
up its "less restrictive" totality-of-the-circumstances test.1
3
This article will analyze the evolution of student loan discharge
jurisprudence in the Eighth Circuit and will consider whetherJesperson
signals that the Eighth Circuit is aligning itself with the majority of
other circuits.
II. WHY CAN'T I DISCHARGE MY STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY?
The short answer is you can, but the road is long and Congress
intended for the hurdles to be exceptionally difficult. The policy rea-
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (B) (2006) (including "any other educational loan that is a
qualified education loan, as defined in section 221 (d) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, incurred by a debtor who is an individual"). Under this amendment,
non-federally backed loans enjoyed the presumption of non-dischargeability under
the bankruptcy code.
10. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971 (a), 112
Stat. 1837 (1998) (enacted).
11. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
The other circuits followed. See, e.g., Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In reOyler),
397 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2005); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400; Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. v. Polleys (In rePolleys), 356 F.3d 1302, 1309 (10th Cir. 2004); Cox, 338 F.3d at
1238; U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt), 348 F.3d 89, 91 (5th Cir.
2003); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Pena (InrePena), 155 F.3d 1108,1112 (9th
Cir. 1998); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298,
305-06 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1993).
12. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In reLong), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir.
2003); see also Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 303
B.R. 823, 840 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
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sons for this high bar are twofold: to "prevent[] abuses of the educa-
tional loan system" and "to safeguard[] the financial integrity of go-
vernmental entities and nonprofit institutions" in the federal student
loan program." The federally insured student loan program "serves
valuable purposes. It affords individuals in all walks of life the oppor-
tunity to obtain an education, and with it the mobility and financial
stability that an education can provide."'
5
Student loans are unique obligations because the federal gov-
ernment loans students money without respect to their creditworthi-
ness.16 Thus, the taxpayers put their faith in students to repay the
debt, except in "rare circumstances" and only where "a certainty of
hopelessness exists." 7 And although the goal is to provide access to
higher education, it is not Congress's policy to provide it for free. 8
Consequently, Congress has expressly excluded student loan debt
from the general discharge provision of the bankruptcy code "unless
excepting such debt from discharge... would impose an undue hard-
ship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents. Absent a showing
of undue hardship, the Bankruptcy Code's "fresh start" will not in-
clude a discharge of any student loan debt.20
14. 4 COLLIERONBANKRUPTcY 523.14, at 523-101 (Lawrence P. King etal., eds.,
15th ed., revised, 2007); see also Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re
Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
15. Frushour, 433 F.3d at 399.
16. As the Tenth Circuit noted: "[S]tudent loans are enabling loans [that] al-
low[] individuals to improve their own human capital and increase their income po-
tential." Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersmann (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033,
1042 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because student loans are unsecured loans-the creditor cannot seize a borrower's
education in the event of a default-Congress set the bar to discharge high and then
federally guaranteed the loans to ensure lender participation. Id. See also Roberson,
999 F.2d at 1135-36; 4 COLLIER, supra note 14, at 523-101.
17. Frushour, 433 F.3d at 401; see also Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136.
18. Heckathorn v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Heckathorn), 199 B.R. 188, 193
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (2006); see also Pelkowski v. Ohio Student Loan
Comm'n (In re Pelkowski), 990 F.2d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1993); Andrews Univ. v. Mer-
chant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Congress enacted 11
U.S.C. § 523 (a) (8) in an effort to prevent abuses in and protect the solvency of educa-
tional loan programs."). Accordingly, "limiting the circumstances under which stu-
dent loan obligations can be discharged in bankruptcy helps preserve the financial
integrity of the student loan program." Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 744.
20. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,286 (1991). The Supreme Court has "ac-
knowledged that a central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which
certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors,
and enjoy 'a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.'" Id. (citing Local Loan Co.
2010] 1683
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A. What is Undue Hardship?
1. One Legal Standard
The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution em-
powers Congress to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
ruptcies throughout the United States." 2' The Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an indi-
vidual debtor from any debt-
(8) unless excepting such debt from discharge under
this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents, for-
(A) (i) an educational benefit overpayment or
loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a govern-
mental unit, or made under any program funded
in whole or in part by a Jgovernmental unit or
nonprofit institution ....
Congress did not provide a specific test or define "undue hard-
ship," but the use of the "adjective 'undue' indicates that Congress
viewed garden-variety hardships [an] insufficient excuse for a dis-
charge of student loans." 
23
2. Two Tests to Effect One Legal Standard
Over the years, courts have developed several legal tests to give
practical effect to the legal standard intended by Congress, but only
two of these tests effectively remain: the Brunner test and the totality-
of-the-circumstances test.
Nine circuits have adopted the Brunner test, formulated by the
United States District Court in the Southern District of NewYork and
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); see also Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Cox (In re
Cox), 338 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that the "fresh start" principle
does not permitjudicially created exceptions to § 523(a) (8)).
21. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 4.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (8) (A) (i) (2006).
23. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In reBrunner), 46 B.R. 752,
753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In reFrushour),
433 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2005); Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d
1083,1087 (9th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 36:41684
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affirmed by the Second Circuit in 1987. The Brunner test requires the
debtor to show
(1) an inability to maintain, based on current income and ex-
penses, a "minimal" standard of living for the debtor and
the debtor's dependents if forced to repay the loans;
(2) "that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state
of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the
repayment period of the student loans";2 4 and
25(3) a good faith effort to repay the loans.
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Brunner test and formally
adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test in Long v. Educational
Credit Management Corp. (In re Long).2" The totality-of-the-
circumstances test requires courts to examine broadly the facts and
circumstances bearing on the debtor's ability to pay the student loans
and other relevant considerations, including
(1) the debtor's past and present financial resources, and those
the debtor can reasonably rely on for the future;
(2) the reasonable necessary living expenses of the debtor and
the debtor's dependents; and
(3) "any other relevant facts and circumstances surrounding
each particular bankruptcy case. ,27
The First Circuit has declined to adopt either test, but most
bankruptcy courts in the First Circuit apply the totality-of-the-
circumstances test. 8 Under either test, the debtor bears the burden
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence on all criteria for an un-
due hardship discharge to be granted.2
24. Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir.
1987)
25. Id.
26. 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 554-55.
28. Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In reNash), 446 F.3d 188, 190-91 (1st
Cir. 2006) ("We see no need in this case to pronounce our views of a preferred me-
thod of identifying a case of 'undue hardship.'"). Puerto Rico and New Hampshire
bankruptcy courts apply the Brunnertest. See, e.g., Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp.
(In reGrigas), 252 B.R. 866 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000). Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island bankruptcy courts apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test. See, e.g., Burk-
head v. United States (In re Burkhead), 304 B.R. 560, 565 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2004);
Lamanna v. EFS Servs., Inc. (In reLamanna), 285 B.R. 347, 353 (Bankr. D. R.I. 2002);
Kopfv. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Kopfj, 245 B.R. 731, 739-40 (Bankr. D. Me, 2000).
29. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
2010] 1685
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B. Evolution of Undue Hardship in the Eighth Circuit
1. The Andrews Analysis: "Can the Debtor Pay?"
In 1981, the Eighth Circuit was the first circuit court to actually
consider the undue hardship exception in Andrews v. South Dakota
Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews).30 Although no formal un-
due hardship test emerged from Andrews, the Eighth Circuit set forth
some general principles regarding the undue hardship analysis rela-
tive to the facts of that case. In construing the legal standard for un-
due hardship, the court focused on the debtor's ability to pay.3' Ul-
timately, the Eighth Circuit declined to reach the substantive issue,
holding instead that the bankruptcy court erroneously discharged the
student loan debt on "an incomplete record., 33 On remand, the
court instructed the lower court to consider the debtor's ability to pay
after determining the debtor's reasonable living expenses against the
34
backdrop of her present income.
2. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test: In re Long
The Eighth Circuit revisited the undue hardship issue and for-
mally adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test more than twenty
years after Andrews. In Long v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In
re Long),35 the Eighth Circuit rejected the Brunner test because it
prefer[red] a less restrictive approach to the "undue hard-
ship" inquiry. We are convinced that requiring our bank-
30. Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In reAndrews), 661 F.2d 702,
704 (8th Cir. 1981).
31. At the time of trial, Gladys Marie Andrews was thirty-six years old, divorced,
and owed about $2500 in student loan debt. Id. at 703. She earned an annual salary
of $10,000, and her monthly student loan payment was $30. Id. She also had Hodg-
kin's Disease, which was in remission. Id.
32. Id. at 704-05. Cf Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d
395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987). Under the Brunner test, the inability to maintain a minimal
standard of living, based on current income and expenses, if forced to repay the stu-
dent loans is "the minimum necessary to establish 'undue hardship.'" Id. (citing
Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reBryant), 72 B.R. 913,915 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987); N.D. State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Frech (In re Frech), 62 B.R. 235
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); Marion v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reMarion),
61 B.R. 815 (Bankr W.D. Pa. 1986)).
33. The record was incomplete because it contained no evidence regarding the
Andrews' reasonable living expenses. Andrews, 661 F.2d at 703. The court "ex-
press[ed] no opinion as to the merits of the debtor's case for discharge." Id. at 705.
34. Id. at 704-05.
35. 322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
[Vol. 36:41686
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ruptcy courts to adhere to the strict parameters of a particu-
lar test would diminish the inherent discretion contained in
§ 523(a) (8) (B). Therefore, we continue-as we first did in
Andrews-to embrace a totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach to the "undue hardship" inquiry. We believe that
fairness and equity require each undue hardship case to be
examined on the unique facts and circumstances that sur-
round the particular bankruptcy.1
6
The debtor, Nanci Long, was a thirty-nine-year-old single mother
who had worked as a successful chiropractor for several years before
experiencing mental health issues. 7 At the time of trial, she lived with
her parents and worked as a laboratory assistant at a community col-
lege earning $14,000 per year. Long's student loan debt was in excess
of $60,000. The bankruptcy court discounted the fact that Long had
sufficient surplus income to make the required income-contingent
monthly payment of fifty-four dollars and discharged her entire stu-
dent loan debt, concluding:
What [the debtor] would be faced with is a sentence of 25
years in payments on an obligation that she could never rea-
listically expect to retire or even reduce. In all probability
the obligation would continue to grow and such a situation
and her best and utmost efforts is not a circumstance and
situation that satisfies the test. Under those circumstances
given the other difficulties that she has, the other responsi-
bilities that she has, the other commitments that she has,
that obligation in that amount which now I believe is ap-
proaching if not over $60,000.00 is unrealistic.
It is unrealistic. It would constitute an undue hardship
and it would impose an unjustifiable burden added to these
other burdens that she has and that she must overcome.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and formally adopted the
totality-of-the-circumstances test for determining undue hardship.
4
0
Summarizing the test, it appeared that the Eighth Circuit intended
36. Id. at 554 (citing Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704). Even though the Long panel
stated it was reaffirming the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Andrews, a
plain reading of Andrews demonstrates that no particular test was established in that
case. See Andrews, 661 F.2d at 703 (remanding the case for further fact-finding as to
debtor's ability to repay the loan in light of her reasonable living expenses).
37. Long, 322 F.3d at 551.
38. Id.
39. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 271 B.R. 322, 326, 332
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002) (quoting the bankruptcy court's unpublished decision), rev'd,
322 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2003).
40. Long, 322 F.3d at 554-55.
2010] 1687
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the totality-of-the-circumstances test's primary consideration to be the
debtor's ability to pay: "Simply put, if the debtor's reasonable future
financial resources will sufficiently cover payment of the student-loan
debt-while still allowing for a minimal standard of living-then the
debt should not be discharged."4' Less than a year later, the Minneso-
ta bankruptcy court rejected this pecuniary approach in Reynolds and
added a whole new dimension to the totality-of-the-circumstances
42
test.
3. Reynolds: Non-Pecuniary Factors Trump the Ability to Pay
S/, In 2004, the Minnesota bankruptcy court granted the debtor,
-Laura Reynolds, a full discharge of student loan debt in excess of
$142,000.4' At the time of trial, Reynolds was thirty-two years old and
had no dependents.4 Despite a history of mental illness dating back
to her middle school years, Reynolds obtained undergraduate and law• 45
degrees from top-tier schools. She passed the Colorado bar exam on
her first attempt, but never worked as an attorney.46 At the time of
trial, Reynolds was a secretary-receptionist earning roughly $30,00047
per year. Reynolds's husband worked as a bus driver and they
41. Id.
42. Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 303 B.R.
823 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
43. Id. at 835, 840-41.
44. Id. at 827. Reynolds's husband had three children from a previous relation-
ship aged fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen at the time of trial. U.S. Dep't of Educ. v.
Reynolds, No. 04-1020, 2004WL 1745835, at *1 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2004). Although
the children did not live with Reynolds and her husband, the household income cal-
culation included support for these children because child support was automatically
deducted from the husband's paycheck. Reynolds, 303 B.R. at 829.
45. Reynolds, 303 B.R. at 827 (stating that debtor received an undergraduate de-
gree from Claremont McKenna College and a law degree from the University of
Michigan). Reynolds had been diagnosed with major depressive illness and chronic
dysthymic disorder and also suffered from anxiety and panic disorders and persistent
personality disorder. Id. at 829. Injunior high, Reynolds experienced symptoms of
suicidal ideation and fatigue and feelings of sadness, hopelessness, and personal isola-
tion for about a year. Id. These symptoms recurred when Reynolds was in high
school, but she did not receive psychiatric or psychological care. Id. Reynolds con-
sulted a psychiatrist for the first time following a severe panic attack in herjunior year
of college and was diagnosed with agoraphobia and depression. Id.
46. Id. at 827-28. Reynolds presented expert testimony to support her position
that she would never be able to qualify to practice law in Minnesota given her history
of mental illness. Id. at 831 n.5.
47. Id. at 828. The bankruptcy court provided an extensive explanation to sup-
port its finding that Reynolds's mental illness precluded her from employment in the
legal field, despite her educational background. Id. at 832 ("As a vocational matter,
the Debtor simply cannot be employed in an administrative or clerical capacity at any
[Vol. 36:41688
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earned a net monthly household income of approximately $3300.48
After paying their monthly household expenses, the couple had $700
left over.49 This surplus was sufficient to make the $567.68 monthly
50
payment on the federal debt under a thirty-year extended term.
At trial, however, Reynolds testified that the mere existence of the debt
was a major stressor and was detrimental to her mental health regi-
men. 51 The court gave significant weight to this non-pecuniary factor
under the "other relevant facts and circumstances" prong of the total-
52
ity-of-the-circumstances test. Calling the ultimate decision "an ex-
tremely difficult call" and acknowledging Eighth Circuit precedent
requiring repayment to the extent possible, the bankruptcy court af-
forded more weight to a non-pecuniary factor than to Reynolds's53
demonstrated ability to make a payment. The bankruptcy court
opined that subjugating Reynolds's severe mental illness to purely fi-
nancial considerations would undermine Long's "less restrictive" ap-
proach and thus discharged the entire $142,000 student loan debt."'
The student loan creditors appealed and the district court affirmed,
thereby putting the issue squarely back to the Eighth Circuit. 5
level of responsibility greater than that of office manager or administrative assis-
tant."). Id.
48. Id. at 829.
49. Id. at 834.
50. Id. at 835. At the time of the original trial, the required monthly payment
was assumed to be between $1,021.55 and $1,641.04, depending on the duration of
repayment. Id.
51. Id. at 837. This position was supported by two psychiatric professionals. Id.
at 837 n.16.
52. Id. at 836-37 ("If this is not one of those 'unique facts and circumstances'
that play into the analysis under Andrews and Long, then nothing is.").
53. Id. at 837-40. The bankruptcy court also noted that Congress could have
structured § 523 (a) (8) to be a strict ability-to-pay consideration, similar to other pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 838-39,839 n.20. On appeal, the district court
noted Long's ambiguity regarding the interaction between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary factors, stating "[ t] he Eighth Circuit has not evaluated the relationship be-
tween the [undue hardship] test's three prongs, or discussed the balance of pecu-
niary versus non-pecuniary concerns that might arise in a particular bankruptcy case."
U.S. Dep't of Educ. v. Reynolds, No. 04-1020, 2004 WL 1745835, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug.
2,2004).
54. Reynolds, 303 B.R. at 836 n.13, 838-39; Reynolds, 2004 WL 1745835, at *5.
55. ECMC and the Department of Education appealed to the BAP, but the deb-
tor elected to have the appeal heard by the district court. Reynolds, 303 B.R. at 823,
affd 2004 WL 1745835, affd, 425 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 811
(2006). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)-(d) (2006) (providing district courts with ap-
pellate jurisdiction over bankruptcy court rulings and circuit courts with appellate
jurisdiction over district court rulings). Two of the original five student loan creditors
opted not to pursue appeal to the Eighth Circuit. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Rey-
nolds (In reReynolds), 425 F.3d 526,529 (8th Cir. 2005). This significantly changed
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a. The Eighth Circuit Muddies the Test.
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the student loan creditors relied
on a single sentence from Longto support their position that the stu-
dent loan debt was improperly discharged: "Simply put, if the deb-
tor's reasonable future financial resources will sufficiently cover pay-
ment of the student loan debt-while still allowing for a minimal
standard of living-then the debt should not be discharged.", 6 The
Eighth Circuit concluded, however, that the creditors were reading
this sentence too narrowly and ignoring the very real possibility that a
debtor's health and finances can be intertwined." In a 2-1 decision,
the Eighth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that the mere exis-
tence of the debt itself constituted an "undue hardship" because it was a
significant block to Reynolds's recovery and that eliminating the debt
would mitigate her symptoms and reduce the possibility of recurring
depression and compensation.
In dissent,Judge William Jay Riley argued that the majority gave
excessive weight to Reynoldss' mental condition. 9 The dissent noted
the double treatment and circular analysis afforded Reynolds's mental
illness by the majority:
To view a serious illness other than through its effect on
income and expenses borders on illogic circularity. The ma-
jority opinion makes this very mistake: it concludes having
an unpaid debt contributes to Reynolds's mental illness, and
mental illness contributes to the inability to repay the debt
(which inability, of course, worsens the mental illness, and
so on). Such an analysis grants double treatment to a deb-
tor's illness, which is at odds with the "fairness and equity"
required by the totality-of-the-circumstances test. In asking
whether illness itself is an undue hardship, the majority
changes this circuit's law- a change I find unwarranted in
either law or policy.6°
the repayment requirement as the income surplus found by the bankruptcy court
($715.50) was sufficient to satisfy the required monthly payment of $502.49 owed to
the remaining creditors. Id.
56. Reynolds, 425 F.3d at 532 (quoting Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 322
F.3d 549, 554-55 (8th Cir. 2003)).
57. "To espouse the creditors' proposed interpretation, we would have to ignore
the possibility-and in many cases reality-that a debtor's health and financial posi-
tion are inextricably intertwined." Id.
58. Id. at 533.
59. Id. at 536-37 (RileyJ, dissenting).
60. Id. at 537 (citing Long, 322 F.3d at 554) (internal citation omitted). The dis-
sent also compared Reynolds to the Andrews debtor, noting that a debtor suffering
[Vol. 36:41690
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The majority's endorsement of non-pecuniary considerations did
little to clarify or guide bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit. If an-
ything, Reynolds muddied the test.6'
b. Life after Reynolds
The Reynolds decision affected the application of the totality-of-
the-circumstances test on several levels. First, Reynolds's endorsement
of non-pecuniary factors appeared to broaden the already amorphous
totality-of-the-circumstances test, with some bankruptcy courts using
Reynolds to justify their ever-expanding judicial discretion in undue
62hardship matters. Several years later, the Minnesota bankruptcy
court took the consideration of non-pecuniary factors even further in
In re Halverson.63 Halverson was sixty-five years old at the time of trial
and had been married for less than two years.64 The court noted that
the greatest strain on the marriage was Halverson's student loan debt
and that Halverson's wife suffered "physical manifestations of the
stress from Halverson's enormous student loan debt."65 The bank-
from cancer could also be impacted by the stress of a large student loan debt. Id.
61. ECMC petitioned the Eighth Circuit for a panel rehearing and then a re-
hearing en banc. The Eighth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc on a
6-5 vote. Reynolds, 425 F.3d 526. Thereafter, ECMC petitioned for a writ of certiora-
ri, which was also denied. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Reynolds, 549 U.S. 811 (2006)
(No. 05-1361).
62. See, e.g., Balm v. Sallie Mae Serv. Corp. (In re Balm), 333 B.R. 443, 448
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2005) ("Stressors arising because of the debt itself may be consi-
dered with the recurring nature of an illness and the impact on not only the debtor's
future health, but the debtor's financial situation."); but see Groves v. Citibank (In re
Groves), 398 B.R. 673,680 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008) (concluding that the debtor's sit-
uation was factually dissimilar to that of the debtor in Reynolds). Groves testified at
trial that she suffered from depression and that the existence of her "insurmounta-
ble" debt contributed to her depression. Groves, 398 B.R. at 679-80. The court dis-
tinguished Reynolds by focusing on the fact that Reynolds was being treated for her
ailments, whereas Groves was not being treated for depression and did not take medi-
cation. Id. at 680-81. The court ultimately concluded that Groves failed to present
evidence to establish that the existence of any debt at all was determinative of her
ability to function and to work. Id. at 681. Despite reaching this conclusion, the
court granted the debtor a partial discharge based on her financial circumstances. Id.
at 686-88.
63. Halverson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Halverson), 401 B.R. 378 (Bankr.
Minn. 2009) (holding that debtor was entitled to discharge of student loans based on
a finding of undue hardship created in part by the strain of the debt itself upon deb-
tor's marriage).
64. Id. at 382. Halverson and his wife were married in 2007, although the exact
date is not specified. The trial was held January 6, 2009. Id. at 380.
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ruptcy court surmised that the marriage would not survive if the stu-
dent loan debt was not discharged. 66 Although other factors contri-
buted to the ultimate conclusion to discharge the student loan debt,
the court laced significant weight on the effects of the debt on the
marriage.
Some courts outside the Eighth Circuit have even followed Rey-
nolds's lead. 8 In In reJackson, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York heard an undue hardship case brought by a deb-
tor who suffered from bi-polar disorder.69 Despite having no expert
witness to testify on his behalf regarding the effect of his condition,
the court was ultimately persuaded that the stress of the student loan
debt and the effect on Jackson's mental condition provided a suffi-
cient basis to discharge the entire debt."
But a different New York bankruptcy court, on very similar facts,
reached the opposite result. Faced with an undue hardship case
brought by a debtor suffering from depressive disorder, anxiety and
panic attacks, the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New
York, in N.M. v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re N.M.), con-
cluded that the avoidance of stress resulting from repaying her stu-
dent loan debt was an insufficient basis to grant an undue hardship
discharge.71
Unlike Jackson, the N.M. holding stands in stark contrast to Rey-
nolds, especially considering the factual parallels. Both cases involved
non-practicing law school graduates with a history of mental illness,
and both debtors had disposable income. The Eighth Circuit's wil-
66. Id. at 388.
67. Such factors included the debtor's age, the size of the debt, the debtor's
physical health and the debtor's future income possibilities. Id.
68. See, e.g., Zook v. Edfinancial Corp. (In re Zook), No. 05-10019, 2009 WL
512436 (Bankr. D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2009) (holding debtor's psychological disorder and
the debt combined constitute an undue hardship allowing debt to be discharged);
Jackson v. Educ. Res. Inst. (In reJackson), No. 06-01433, 2007 WL 2295585 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007) (finding bipolar disorder constituted an undue hardship).
69. Jackson, 2007 WL 2295585.
70. Id. at *6-7,
71. N.M. v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re N.M.), 325 B.R. 507 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2005).
72. See supra notes 43-50. The debtor in N.M. graduated from law school in
1984 and had worked in private practice but was employed in the development office
of a cultural organization at the time of trial. N.M., 325 B.R at 509. The debtor in
Reynoldshad disposable household income of $700. Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. As-
sistance Agency (In re Reynolds), 303 B.R. 823, 834 (Bankr. D. Minn, 2004). The
court in N.M. never stated the exact amount of the debtor's disposable income but
indicated she had sufficient income to pay the $4000 annually required towards her
student loan debt. N.M., 325 B.R. at 510.
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lingness to accord significant weight to the non-pecuniary factors pro-
vides the only reasonable justification for these different outcomes.
Second, Reynolds affected the totality-of-the-circumstances test's
analysis of debtors' income. Concurring specially, Judge Myron
Bright said it was improper to consider household income in the undue
hardship analysis. 73 Specifically,Judge Bright questioned the proprie-
ty of allocating all of a household's disposable income towards repay-
ment of student loan debt incurred by only one contributing house-74
hold member. Judge Bright emphasized that Reynolds incurred her
student loan debt prior to her marriage, and the record did not show
75
that her husband had assumed responsibility for repayment. As a re-
sult,Judge Bright would have allocated half of the household surplus
to Reyolds' husband as not available to repay Reynolds' student loan
debt.
This analysis is at direct odds with the well-established principle
that household income is the proper startin point when considering
a debtor's ability to repay student loan debt. Judge Bright, however,
relied on Innes v. State (In re Innes) to support the conclusion that Rey-
nolds's husband is entitled to half of the monthly surplus. Like Rey-
nolds, the husband-debtor in Innes contributed about 52% of the
household income. 7s The bankruptcy court considered all of the non-
debtor wife's income, applied her income to one-half of the family's
basic expenses, and allowed the non-debtor wife to use the remaining
income to meet reasonable and appropriate non-luxury expendi-79
tures. Although the bankruptcy court acknowledged that a non-
73. The majority decision purposely did not address this issue. Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Reynolds (In re Reynolds), 425 F.3d 526,534 (8th Cir. 2005) (Bright,
J., concurring specially).
74. Id. at 535-36.
75. Id. at 535.
76. Id. at 535-36.
77. White v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re White), 243 B.R. 498, 509 n.9 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1999) (citing forty-nine cases that consider the income of the non-debtor
spouse when determining whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of
living while repaying student loan debt). The White court concluded that because §
523 (a) (8) considers the impact of a finding of non-dischargeability on the debtor and
the debtor's dependents, the income of the debtor's entire household must be consi-
dered. Id. at 510. Judge Bright mentions White but factually distinguishes it from
Reynolds. Reynolds, 425 F.3d at 535.
78. Innes v. State (In re Innes), 284 B.R. 496, 500 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002). The
debtor-husband contributed $30,690.32 (or approximately 52%) of the $58,839.32
annual household income. Id. Similarly, Reynolds contributed $1700 (or 51.5%) of
the household monthly income of $3300. Reynolds v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency (In re Reynolds), 303 B.R. 823, 828-29 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2004).
79. Innes, 284 B.R. at 507. The one-half multiplier used by the bankruptcy court
16932010]
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debtor's income should be applied to that spouse's fair share of the
family expenses, the general rule was inapplicable here because of the
nearly equal income contribution of the spouses and the non-
luxurious lifestyle enjoyed by the debtor and his dependents.0
The Minnesota bankruptcy court also gained some Reynolds trac-
tion by steadfastly refusing to consider the income of the non-debtor
spouse in the Halverson case.8' Halverson and his spouse married
82
when both were in their early sixties. Before they married, they en-
tered into an antenuptial agreement to memorialize their intent to
keep their finances separate. The court noted that a spouse's in-
come may be considered in the undue hardship analysis but only to. ) 84
the extent that it decreases the debtor's expenses. Ultimately, the
court concluded that the non-debtor spouse was free to spend her in-
come as she saw fit, a conclusion at odds with the majority view.8
Outside the Eighth Circuit, courts generally continue to useS • 86
household income as the starting point. In Davis v. Educational Credit
Management Corp. (In reDavis), the Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of New York was faced with a situation where the majority of
the household income was earned by the non-debtor spouse. While
acknowledging that Davis met the undue hardship standard if the
was affirmed, although the non-debtor wife's income contribution was approximately
48%. The court also suggested that paying for the college education of her children
was a permissible use of the non-debtor wife's income. Id. at 506.
80. Id. at 507-08. The non-debtor spouse in White earned three times the in-
come of the debtor, and the household enjoyed more than a minimal standard of liv-
ing. White, 243 B.R. at 512 n.15; See also Halverson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Hal-
verson), 401 B.R. 378, 386 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009); Innes, 284 B.R. at 508.
81. Halverson, 401 B.R. 378.
82. Id. at 386.
83. Id. The antenuptial agreement memorialized their understanding that their
premarital property would not become marital property and that neither party would
be responsible for or obligated to pay any liability incurred by the other. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. ("It would be unfair to expect lthe non-debtor spouse] to either pay all of
Halverson's personal expenses just so he can make payments on a loan he incurred
years before the marriage, or to pay those loans for him."); see also supra note 77 (dis-
cussing White, 243 B.R. 498.
86. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Am. Educ. Servs. (In re Lorenz), 337 B.R. 423 (B.A.P. 1st
Cir. 2006) (taking finances of partner into account, debtor failed to prove undue
hardship); Heinrich v. Nelnet (In re Heinrich), No. 08-02029, 2009 WL 613574
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2009) (including income of minor child's paper delivery
route in household income); Archibald v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. (In reArc-
hibald), 280 B.R. 222 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2002) (taking household income into ac-
count).
87. Davis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Davis), 336 B.R. 604 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 2006), rev'd, 373 B.R. 241 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
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court only considered her income, the court posed a number of hypo-
thetical situations regarding the relevance of marital considerations in
the undue hardship analysis:
[I] n a different case, a minimally employed debtor might re-
side with parents, siblings, or friends. Should discharge de-
pend upon total household income, when a discharge of
educational loans is allowed to a similarly employed and
employable debtor who lives alone? Alternatively, should
the court deny a discharge because a debtor could have cho-
sen to return to the parental abode? To what extent should
the court ever consider the prospects for a marriage that
might place the debtor into a household where repayment
of the student loan would impose a more manageable finan-
cial burden?88
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court determined that Davis satisfied
the test for undue hardship and discharged all but the principal sum
of $8150.89 On appeal, the district court reversed, holding it was legal
error not to consider the income of the non-debtor spouse. 9° Consi-
dering the total household income, the district court concluded that
Davis did not satisfy the minimal-standard-of-living prong.91
The Eighth Circuit's Reynolds decision blew the household in-
come analysis door open to interpretation, and it remains to be seen
how courts will handle the issue, especially in light of other concerns
embedded within the household income inquiry. 9' Post-Reynolds, the
Eighth Circuit's endorsement of non-pecuniary factors continued to
muddy the undue hardship analysis. 93 Left unanswered by Reynolds
was the proper interplay between disposable income, required
monthly payment, and an undue hardship discharge. Because Rey-
nolds took the seemingly unambiguous phrase from Long and subor-
88. Davis, 336 B.R. at 609.
89. Id. at 610.
90. Davis, 373 B.R. at 241. See supra note 79 (discussing Innes v. State (In re In-
nes), 284 B.R. 496 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2002)).
91. Davis, 373 B.R. at 241.
92. See, e.g., Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses be
Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 961 (1998) (considering state laws re-
garding spousal assets and marital property generally, marriage as a contract, and
marriage as a partnership). Dickerson concludes that "because Congress currently
gives debtors certain benefits based simply on marital status, it must decide what mar-
riage means and to what extent married couples must love, honor, and pay each oth-
er's debts." Id. at 1022.
93. The concurring opinion also opened the door to a wholesale disruption of
the household income issue. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Reynolds (In reReynolds),
425 F.3d 526, 534 (8th Cir. 2005) (BrightJ. concurring).
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dinated it to a consideration of non-pecuniary factors, the question
remained: In the absence of non-pecuniary factors, is the existence of disposa-
ble income sufficient to satisfy the required monthly payment a proper basis for
denying an undue hardship discharge? In 2009, the Eighth Circuit gave
us the answer.
C. Jesperson: The Eighth Circuit Tightens Up the Test
Debtor MarkJesperson was a forty-three-year-old unmarried at-
torney with two children.94 Although he was a recovering alcoholic,
Jesperson had no mental or physical impairments or limitations.9'
Jesperson spent nearly eleven years obtaining his undergraduate de-
gree, but graduated from law school in less than five years and passed
the Minnesota bar exam on his first attempt.
96
The bankruptcy court aptly characterized Jesperson's sporadic
employment history as a "history of employment retention difficulty"
and observed that "his record of work experience is besmirched by a
patent lack of ambition, cooperation and commitment. 97 At the time
of trial, however, Jesperson was working through a temporary legal
placement service and earning approximately $48,000 per year, with
net monthly income of $2680.98 The bankruptcy court determined
thatJesperson's monthly expenses were $2625 and found thatJesper-
son was eligible for an income contingent repayment plan (ICRP)
that would make his estimated payments between $514 and $629 per
month.99 Despite having an income surplus, the bankruptcy court fo-
94. Jesperson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In reJesperson), 366 B.R. 908,910 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 2007). Jesperson had two children from two prior relationships. Id. He was
under a court order to pay $500 monthly for his oldest child. Id. There was no court
order in place for the youngest child. Id.
95. Jesperson had been sober for nearly eleven years at the time of trial. Id.
96. Jesperson attended school irregularly for only five of eleven consecutive years
between 1983 and 1994, finally obtaining a Bachelor of Arts degree in English litera-
ture. Id. Jesperson started law school in 1995 and earned his Juris Doctorate from
Lewis and Clark Law School in 2000. Id. at 911.
97. Id. at 911.
98. Id. at 910, 916. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate how the court
arrived at this net income calculation. However, the district court's opinion clarified
that this calculation was based on a presumed 33% tax bracket. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. v. Jesperson, No. 06-2130, 2007 WL 4105221, at *6 n.3 (D. Minn. Nov. 14,
2007).
99. Jesperson, 366 B.R. at 916. The ICRP is a repayment option available to stu-
dent loan borrowers in the William D. Ford Direct Loan Program. See generally 34
C.F.R. § 685, etseq. (2008). EffectiveJuly 1,2009, another income based repayment
option became available to all federal student loan borrowers. Similar to the ICRP,
the Income Based Repayment (IBR) option is a payment option that determines the
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cused on Jesperson's historical earning capacity, noting that "[t] he
present time, since January of [2007], is an unprecedented period of
pecuniary abundance for Jesperson. "'00 The court concluded that
"[r]ealistically, based on the concrete past, the expectation thatJes-
person [would] maintain or increase his current rate of pay is one
part rational to two parts imagination," and, therefore, the court dis-
chargedjesperson's student loan debt, which totaled over $364,000. l0I
To support the discharge, the bankruptcy court focused primarily
on the interplay between the ICRP and a § 523(a) (8) undue hardship
discharge. 0 The court ultimately concluded that, although the ICRP
is a proper consideration in the undue hardship analysis, many factors
contribute to the appropriate weight to give a debtor's ability to pay
under the ICRP. l0 3 The court pointed to an amortization table noting
that, even with the lowest possible monthly ICRP payment of $514,
none ofJesperson's payments would reduce the outstanding princip-
al, nor would they be sufficient to cover the monthly accruing inter-104
est. After concluding the ICRP was not a viable option forJesper-
son, the bankruptcy court discharged the student loan debt, holding:
Jesperson has only to look forward to a quarter century of
negative amortization, the burden of poor credit and a cash-
only lifestyle due to a heavy debt to income ratio, until final-
ly at the age of 68 he would be released..., and then have a
required payment by considering the borrower's income, family size, and 150% of the
applicable poverty guidelines. 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.215, 685.221 (EffectiveJuly 1,2009).
The annual repayment amount under the IBR is capped at 15% (instead of 20% un-
der the ICRP) of the borrower's disposable income. Id.
InJesperson, the difference in the estimated monthly payment amounts are
based on the applicable family size used in the calculation. Jesperson, 366 B.R. at 913.
The $629 payment assumes a family size of one; the $514 payment assumes a family
size of three. Id. An annual income of $48,000 was used in the calculation. Id.
100. Jesperson, 366 B.R. at913.
101. Id. at913, 918.
102. Id. at 914-16. The bankruptcy court said, "[I] f the ICRP is intended to sup-
plant the judicial process under § 523(a) (8), serve as the sole and final resort for fi-
nancially distressed federal student loan borrowers, and entirely eliminate possible
dischargeability of student loan debt, then Congress may so remake the law and re-
peal § 523(a) (8)." Id. at 915.
103. Examples include the debtor's age, the potential for a poor credit burden,
and potential forgiveness with possible derivative income tax liability. Id. at 916.
104. Id. at 917. "[O]ver the course of 25 years the debtor will never be able to
make a single payment actually against the ECMC debt." Id. The court seemed to
make a distinction between payment and actual payment, a distinction not relevant in
the § 523(a) (8) analysis: "Importantly, the lengthy and burdensome participation of
the debtor in the ICRP, in this particular case under the totality of these unique cir-
cumstances, would result in little or no actual repayment relief to the lenders and
loan guarantors in any event." Id. at 918 (emphasis added).
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real opportunity for a fresh start. In short, without the relief
of discharge now, the debtor would, in effect, be sentenced
to 25 years in a debtors' prison without walls.
0 5
The district court affirmed, and ECMC appealed to the Eighth Cir-.106
cuit.
In its decision, the Eighth Circuit rightly noted the rigorous bur-
den a debtor faces when seeking a § 523 (a) (8) discharge and reite-
rated the passage from Long setting forth the appropriate discharge
standard. The court also took a markedly different view of the facts
presented, specifically regardingJesperson's employment history and
prior payment history, noting thatJesperson had quit each of hisjobs
for a variety of personal reasons and that the future outlook of his
current temporary position was better than suggested by the lower
court.' °8 Significantly, the Eighth Circuit pointed out thatJesperson
had never made any payments on any of his loans and quotedjesper-
son's admission at trial that, even f he had extra money, he did not think
he should have to pay his loans.'0 After correcting several bankruptcy
court errors regardingJesperson's income and expenses, the court
foundJesperson had a monthly surplus of about $900."'
The court also disagreed with the lower court's conclusion re-
gardingJesperson's earning potential. Givenjesperson's "young age,
good health, number of degrees, marketable skills, and lack of sub-
stantial obligations to dependents or mental or physical impair-
ments," the court concluded that the only possible basis for granting
Jesperson an undue hardship discharge was the
sheer magnitude of his student loan debts.... When the
size of the debts is the principal basis for a claim of undue
hardship, the generous repayment plans Congress autho-
rized the Secretary of Education to design and offer under
the [Ford Program] become more relevant to a totality-of-
105. Id.
106. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.Jesperson, No. 06-2130, 2007 WL 4105221, at
*2-3 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2007). ECMC was the only creditor to appeal the bankrupt-
cy court's ruling. Id. at *1 n.1.
107. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2009).
See also supra notes 35-38.
108. Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 779.
109. Id.
110. For example, the court held it was clear error to use the inflated tax rate of
33 1/3% and to estimate housing expenses at $1000. "On this record, it is apparent
that the court underestimatedjesperson's monthly net income and overestimated his
reasonable and necessary living expenses in concluding he has no current surplus
from which student loans could be repaid." The court relied on an after-tax net in-
come of $3300 applying a 17.5% tax rate. Id. at 780.
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the-circumstances undue hardship analysis.'
The court specifically noted too the incongruous results that
would be reached if a debtor were granted an undue hardship dis-
charge because his prior inaction and failure to pay allowed the debt
to grow substantially." 2 Lastly, the Eighth Circuit emphasized the im-
portance of alternative repayment options in situations where the size
of the debt was the only colorable basis for a claim of undue hard-
ship."3 BecauseJesperson had an income surplus sufficient to satisfy
the required ICRP payment, the Eighth Circuit reversed the discharge
in another 2-1 decision." 4
Judge Smith, specially concurring, agreed that the discharge
should be reversed, but wrote separately to emphasize that ICRP was
merely one factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances test analysis."
5
Judge Smith highlighted the fact thatJesperson's situation was self-
imposed and a direct consequence of his voluntary choices:
Jesperson's current situation seems to be the result of his
own self-imposed limitations, evidenced by his routinely
quitting jobs after a short period of time. Such a "patent
lack of ambition, cooperation and commitment," .. . does
not support a finding of dischargeability under § 523(a) (8).'6
The dissent strongly disagreed thatJesperson's discharge should
be reversed, primarily rejecting the majority's overemphasis of the
ICRP in the undue hardship:
Therefore, I emphasize that placing undue weight on a deb-
tor's ability to qualify for the ICRP improperly limits the in-
herent discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges when eva-
luating requests for § 523(a) (8) relief, and reduces the
totality-of-the-circumstances test to a simple arithmetical cal-
culation.
Further, overemphasizing the impact of the ICRP would be
111. Id. at 780-81.
112. Id. at 780.
113. Id. at 781.
114. Id. at 783. Interestingly, the last two student loan hardship matters from the
Eighth Circuit have generated six different opinions. Both Reynolds andJesperson had
a majority, specially concurring, and dissent opinions.
115. Id. at 783 (Smith, J., concurring). "I write separately to emphasize that
whether the debtor enrolled in the [ICRP] remains merely 'a factor' to consider
when applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test." Id. The dissentingjudge con-
curred with this statement. Id. at 787 (Bye,J.,joining, in part,Judge Smith's concur-
ring opinion, and dissenting).
116. Id. at 784-85 (Smith,J, concurring).
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antithetical to the exercise of judicial discretion mandated
by § 523(a) (8) and reflected in our totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis.' 7
The bankruptcy court's disregard of the ICRP in Jesperson is not
surprising considering that the intermediate appellate courts in the
Eighth Circuit have been very critical of the ICRP and how, if at all, it
should alter the § 523(a) (8) analysis.1 8 Nationally, there is no real
judicial consensus regarding the ICRP as an alternative to a § 523 (a) (8)
discharge. " 9 This makes the Eighth Circuit's decision especially re-
markable, because it represents not only a significant departure from
the usual ICRP analysis in the Eighth Circuit, but it also contravenes
the approach taken by some recent decisions addressing the issue. 1
°
Further, the Eighth Circuit rebutted many of the common argu-
ments advanced by ICRP detractors. First, the court rejected the ar-
gument that forcing a debtor into the ICRP contravenes the "fresh
start" principle of the Bankruptcy Code and clarified that the absence
117. Id. at 786-89 (Bye, J.,joining, in part, Judge Smith's concurring opinion,
and dissenting).
118. See, e.g., Lee v. Regions Bank Student Loans (In reLee), 352 B.R. 91 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 2006) (suggesting that ICRP serves a fundamentally different purpose than
the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus should not be given un-
due weight under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); Cumberworth v. U.S.
Dep't of Educ. (In reCumberworth), 347 B.R. 652 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006) (stating that
a debtor's ability or inability to participate in an ICRP plan is merely one of many fac-
tors to be considered by bankruptcy courts).
119. Compare Fahrenz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Fahrenz), No. 05-1657,
2008 WL 4330312, at * 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2008) ("I also agree that the exis-
tence of a zero payment under the ICRP does not generally obviate the need for un-
due hardship discharges in bankruptcy."); DeNittis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
DeNittis), 362 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) ("To hold that debtors must partic-
ipate in the Ford Program, if eligible, would be no more than the Court abdicating its
responsibility to determine the discahrgeability of a student loan."), with Mosko v.
Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 515 F.3d 319, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (seeking out loan con-
solidation options is "an important component of the good-faith inquiry"); Tirch v.
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In reTirch), 409 F.3d 677 (6th Cir. 2005) (deb-
tor unable to prove good faith for failure to take advantage of the ICRP); Pa. Higher
Educ. Assistance Agencyv. Birrane (In reBirrane), 287 B.R. 490 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002)
(good-faith measured by a debtor's effort to participate in the ICRP); see also Terrence
L. Michael &Janie M. Phelps, "Judges?!-We Don't Need No StinkingJudge!!!". The Dis-
charge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income Contingent Repayment Plan, 38
TEX. TECH L. REV. 73 (2005).
120. See, e.g., Booth v. U.S. Dep'tofEduc. (In reBooth), 410 B.R. 672 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 2009) (debtor not precluded from establishing an inability to maintain a mi-
nimal standard of living by virtue of having a $0 monthly payment obligation under
the ICRP); Zook v. Edfinancial Corp., No. 05-10019,2009 WL 512436 (Bankr. D.D.C.
Feb. 27, 2009) (failure to pursue the ICRP not bad faith because the ICRP is not al-
ways a viable option for debtors).
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of a fresh start for a debtor able to make the required monthly ICRP
payment is not an undue hardship.' 2' The majority also brushed off
speculation that the ICRP forgiveness would create a taxable event:
"Likewise, the court's reference to 'a potentially significant tax bill'
when any unpaid balance is cancelled after twenty-five years ignored
the fact that cancellation results in taxable income only if the borrow-




Third, and perhaps most important, the Eighth Circuit emphasized
that a debtor's future income possibilities are not relevant when a
debtor is eligible for the ICRP, likely because the ICRP calculation ac-
counts for potential income fluctuations and adjusts the required
monthly payment accordingly."'
It is important to clarify that the majority opinion in Jesperson
does not stand for the proposition that eligibility in the ICRP auto-
matically precludes a § 523 (a) (8) discharge. 114 In fact, no circuitS125
court has mandated such a result. Rather,Jesperson reinforces that a
debtor with surplus income sufficient to satisfy the monthly payment
required by an available repayment option is not entitled to an undue
hardship discharge under § 523 (a) (8) .26
121. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v.Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2009).
122. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 108(a) (1) (B) (2006)).
123. Id. at 783. "When a debtor is eligible for the ICRP, the court in determining
undue hardship should be less concerned that future income may decline." Id. See
also 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2009).
124. The dissent infers that the majority opinion requires denial of discharge to
anyone who is eligible for the ICRP. Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 786-90 (Bye,J.,joining, in
part, Judge Smith's concurring opinion, and dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mosley (In re Mosley), 494 F.3d 1320,
1327 (11th Cir. 2007) (debtor's failure to enroll in the ICRP did not detract from
other good faith efforts at repayment); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re
Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming prior rejection of perse rule that
failure to enroll in the ICRP precludes a finding of good faith); Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. v. Nys (In reNys), 446 F.3d 938,947 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that a debtor's con-
sideration of consolidation options is an important consideration, but quoting A/de-
rete, infra, that participation is not required); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour
(In reFrushour), 433 F.3d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that a debtor's effort to
seek out loan consolidation options that make the debt less onerous is an important
consideration, but not dispositive); Alderete v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In reAlde-
rete), 412 F.3d 1200, 1206 (10th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with the bankruptcy court that
participation in an alternative repayment program is not required to satisfy the good-
faith prong of the Brunner test).
126. Although the opinion focuses on the ICRP, it is likely that the reasoning




Swedback and Prettner: Discharge or No Discharge? An Overview of Eighth Circuit Jurispru
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
III. CONCLUSION
Our legal system rests on the principle of precedent-that like
cases will be decided in a like manner.127 Moreover, the U.S. Constitu-
tion requires uniformity in bankruptcy law. 28 In this light, Congress
enacted and subsequently expanded the undue hardship statute to
make it clear that student loan debt is not dischargeable except in the
most extreme circumstances and not at all if the debtor has the finan-
cial ability to repay the debt. Of the examples at the beginning of this
article, the third example -Laura Reynolds -is the only debtor who
received a discharge despite a demonstrated ability to pay the debt.
The Eighth Circuit's Reynolds decision deviated not only from every
other circuit's precedent but also from the congressional mandate in
§ 523(a) (8).
To a large degree, the Eighth Circuit seems to have righted the
Reynolds anomaly in itsJesperson decision. By tightening up the totality-
of-the-circumstances test and refocusing the analysis on the debtor's
ability to pay, the Eighth Circuit reminds bankruptcy courts that a
large student loan debt, by itself, cannotjustify a discharge under the
bankruptcy code. Jesperson also underscores the importance of alter-
native income-based repayment programs in the undue hardship
analysis. UnderJesperson, income-based repayment plans are neither
dispositive nor an infringement ofjudicial discretion. Rather, Jesper-
son recognizes that repayment of student loans, even if under an in-
come-based payment scheme that doesn't fully repay the debt, is criti-
cal to maintain the federal student loan program.
127. As the Seventh Circuit held: "Legal rules have value only to the extent they
guide primary conduct or the exercise ofjudicial discretion. Laundry lists, which may
show ingenuity in imagining what could be relevant but do not assign weights or con-
sequences to the factors, flunk the test of utility." In rePlunkett, 82 F.3d 738, 741 (7th
Cir. 1996).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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